Here’s a commentary in TIME on Tim Geithner’s comments before the Senate accusing China of manipulating its currency. Conclusion: More rhetoric than substance. – Ilene
Behind Geithner’s China-Currency Charge
On Capitol Hill on Thursday, Tim Geithner sent a little thrill up the leg of all the American trade unions that worked so hard to get Barack Obama elected. The Treasury Secretary–designate — whose appointment, despite his embarrassing tax travails, was waved through to the full Senate yesterday by the Finance Committee — declared in a written statement to the committee that China was guilty of "manipulating" its currency for trade advantage.
For all the pressure the Bush Administration put on Beijing to increase the value of the renminbi (RMB), which increases the price of Chinese-made goods in export markets and thus in theory should help diminish China’s massive trade surplus, the U.S. Treasury has never formally cited China for currency manipulation. Doing so under U.S. law would compel the White House to open formal negotiations with China over its currency policy. Trade hawks in Congress, pushed by union allies and some manufacturing lobbies in Washington, have long pined for this. But the Bush Administration resisted, preferring to fold the currency issue into the broader biannual "strategic economic dialogue" (SED) started by former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson. That less confrontational setting was more likely to produce results on the currency issue than any forum that smacked of the U.S. putting Beijing on trial for "manipulation," the Bushies believed. In fact, over the past two years, the RMB did rise nearly 20% against the dollar. (Read "China’s Trade Slump Worsens in December.")
Geithner’s rhetoric before the Senate raises the question: Is the less confrontational approach now history? The short answer: in tone, perhaps. But in substance, not a whole lot is likely to change. The young Treasury Secretary–designate knew the "manipulator" line would get a lot of attention, as it has…
But beyond tougher rhetoric, is the new Administration really likely to get tough with China on trade, as so many union supporters of Obama hope? Unlikely. In fact, it’s hard to think of anything business and investors on both sides of the Pacific would welcome less right now than a U.S.-China trade rumble. Both countries are in the midst of serious economic pain, which trade tensions would only worsen. There are enough comparisons with the Great Depression out there already without dredging up the memory of Smoot-Hawley, the 1930 legislation in the U.S. that put a tariff on some 20,000 imported goods — to devastating effect on trade.
Geithner, despite the rhetoric before the Senate, understands this better than most. He spent much of his career in the 1990s at the Treasury Department working on international issues, with particular emphasis on Asia. He understands how complex the bilateral economic relationship with China is and will probably be inclined to resist pressure to formally cite Beijing as a bad actor on currency…
That reluctance is not necessarily for the reason often cited when U.S.-China trade issues come up. A frequent assertion by critics of U.S. trade policy is that Washington can’t afford to get tough with China on trade because Beijing buys so much U.S. Treasury debt. Washington can’t even say "Boo" to the Chinese, this argument goes, without risking that China would take its money and go home, driving U.S. interest rates up in the process.
This is a fundamental misreading of the U.S.-China economic relationship…If China reversed course and pulled money out of the U.S. in a big way, it would ravage the value of its own portfolio, which is still largely invested in long-term bonds and notes. This is the essence of mutually assured economic destruction, and the Chinese understand that as well as anyone…
Full article here.
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The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (sometimes known as the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act) was an act signed into law on June 17, 1930, that raised U.S. tariffs on over 20,000 imported goods to record levels. In the United States 1,028 economists signed a petition against this legislation, and after it was passed, many countries retaliated with their own increased tariffs on U.S. goods, and American exports and imports plunged by more than half. In the opinion of some economists, the Smoot-Hawley Act was a catalyst for the severe reduction in U.S.-European trade from its high in 1929 to its depressed levels of 1932 that accompanied the start of the Great Depression. Wikipedia.
