‘I don’t really care what happens to Ukraine’: what a JD Vance vice presidency could mean for the world

After months of gamesmanship and speculation, JD Vance has emerged as Donald Trump’s 2024 running mate and the heir apparent to the America First movement.

With less than two years in Congress under his belt, the first-term senator from Ohio has very little experience in politics, let alone conducting foreign policy.

Yet Vance represents a clear departure from the Ronald Reagan-era foreign policy views that characterised Trump’s previous vice president, Mike Pence. Pence spent much of his time in office making trips to reassure US allies and partners overseas, delivering speeches aimed at providing strategic clarity to Trump’s often unpredictable actions.

As Trump’s vice presidential pick, Vance’s foreign policy views could prove similarly influential if the former president is re-elected in November. So, what could a Vance vice presidency mean for the rest of the world?

An ‘Asia-First’-style isolationist on Ukraine

Vance is one of many so-called “Asia First” Republican politicians who want to limit US attention on Europe and reorient the country’s resources towards countering China’s rise.

In Congress, he has garnered a reputation as one of the most vociferous opponents of continued US aid to Ukraine, saying the US has “provided a blanket of security to Europe for far too long” and calling for European allies to “step up” their own military contributions to Kyiv.

Quick google search on J.D. Vance’s stance on Ukraine gave me this and I’m starting to feel hopeless pic.twitter.com/STk640pR3A

— Julia Tymoshenko 🇺🇦 (@YuliaTymosha) July 15, 2024

Just after Russia’s invasion in February 2022, in fact, Vance bluntly declared

I gotta be honest with you, I don’t really care what happens to Ukraine one way or another.

At the same time, Vance maintains he is not advocating for the US to “abandon Europe”. Rather, he wants to place more focus on what he sees as a more pressing threat to US interests – competition with China – because, he said in a speech last year, “that’s where the real enemy is.”

An economic nationalist on China

Vance describes his position on China as a “straightforwardly economically nationalist argument.” He views include increasing support for US manufacturing as a way of directly countering China’s rise, saying “we should be making more of our stuff” even at the cost of a “couple basis points GDP”.

Vance believes increasing tariffs on Chinese imports will create economic opportunities in Rust Belt states like Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania.

Notably, he has even praised President Joe Biden’s 2022 CHIPS and Science Act, aimed at boosting domestic semiconductor chip manufacturing so the US can better compete with China and other countries, as a “great piece of legislation.”

While the US and its allies have maintained normal trade relations with China ever since its accession to the World Trade Organization in 2000, Vance has co-sponsored legislation that would revoke China’s favoured trade status, a move that would be hugely destabilising for the global economy.

A ‘fan of AUKUS’

Though Vance wants to reorient the US towards the Indo-Pacific region to counter China, he has spoken relatively little about US alliances in Asia.

In February this year, he gave a brief nod to Australia when he described himself as a “fan of AUKUS” during remarks at the Munich Security Conference.

In the broader region, Vance has said he wants to “try to promote” US allies with aligned interests, while encouraging “those who are a little bit more on the fence to think about things from our perspective.”

He has based his support for Taiwan in economic terms, saying the self-governing island that China has vowed to retake by force, if necessary, must be protected because of the risk that an invasion could “decimate our entire economy.”

A shape-shifter on climate change

Like a number of his views, Vance’s position on climate change shifted when he ran for the US Senate in 2022.

In 2020, he spoke of the “climate problem” facing the United States, but when seeking Trump’s endorsement for the Senate, described himself as “sceptical” of human responsibility for climate change.

He also sought to repeal US tax credits for electric vehicles.

We have sky high inflation and an economy now officially in recession. But don’t worry, Tim Ryan and his Democrat buddies have a solution: tax credits for rich people to buy electric cars made in China. What a joke. pic.twitter.com/RtcdiIQYov

— J.D. Vance (@JDVance1) July 28, 2022

An heir to the ‘America First’ agenda

In the past, Vance has specifically singled out foreign policy as a key factor in his support for Trump.

In early 2023 – when many Republicans were supporting Florida Governor Ron DeSantis’ presidential aspirations – Vance penned an op-ed endorsing Trump’s presidential run and lauding his first term as “the first real disruption to a failed consensus” in US foreign policy.

In the piece, Vance praised Trump’s “successful foreign policy” as the “most important part” of his legacy, saying he “started no wars” and pushed for the United States to “take more responsibility for its own defense.”

Previous vice presidents have scorned the office for its subsidiary role and limited power compared to the presidency. There is every chance that in a second Trump presidency, the position would be no different.

But Biden himself has shown how vice presidents can carve out their own roles as key advisers, particularly when it comes to foreign policy. And with Trump’s backing, Vance could also be well set up for his own run for the presidency in 2028.

Vance’s shape-shifting views make it difficult to forecast exactly what his role as Trump’s deputy could mean for the Indo-Pacific region. But paying close attention to his foreign policy philosophy as it evolves in the coming months may prove crucial to understanding the contours of a second Trump term – or indeed a future Vance administration.

Ava Kalinauskas, Research Associate, United States Studies Centre, University of Sydney and Samuel Garrett, Research Associate, United States Studies Centre, University of Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.