Lebanese society is split over a potential war with Israel
By Rola El-Husseini, Lund University
Hezbollah began launching rockets into northern Israel in solidarity with Palestinians shortly after the start of the war in Gaza. These attacks prompted skirmishes along the border that have escalated and spread further into the territory of both countries.
On July 10, for example, the Israeli military said it had hit a Hezbollah site just 49 miles from the capital, Beirut. The strike came two weeks after Israeli defence minister Yoav Gallant threatened to take Lebanon “back to the stone age”. After an 18-year lull, a new war between Hezbollah and Israel seems inevitable.
Lebanese politics is based on a power-sharing system among the country’s different sectarian groups. Hezbollah, a Shia Muslim organisation that emerged in the 1980s, is one of these groups.
Hezbollah has near total control over its own community, which it also represents in parliament. Dissenting Shia voices have all but disappeared following the assassination of a Shia public intellectual and vocal Hezbollah critic, Lokman Slim, in 2021. However, the rest of Lebanese society is divided about Hezbollah and the group’s involvement in a war with Israel.
The leaders of Lebanon’s two other major communities, the Sunni Muslims and the Christians, and those of the smaller but politically powerful Druze community, have issued statements urging caution and restraint. Yet, some Sunni and Christian groups in particular are sympathetic to Hezbollah’s position.
Sunnis
Lebanon’s Sunnis are split along ideological lines. Since the start of the war, Sunni Islamist groups have begun to side with Hezbollah against Israel. On the other hand, more secular groups and people have called for restraint.
The country’s Sunni former prime minister, Fouad Siniora, for example, has accused Hezbollah of taking Lebanon “to the brink of the abyss”. Siniora was in office in 2006 when a cross-border attack by Hezbollah fighters sparked a 34-day conflict with Israel.
Many Sunni Islamists in Lebanon have long viewed Hezbollah with distrust. This was, in large part, because the group turned its weapons on Sunni backers of the Lebanese government in May 2008 during a brief spell of intense sectarian violence.
But some of the Sunni groups that were apprehensive of Hezbollah have grown closer to the organisation over the past nine months. One of these groups is the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaa Islamiya, whose Al-Fajr forces have been fighting Israel in southern Lebanon alongside Hezbollah since late October 2023.
The group’s participation in the hostilities has, however, been “largely symbolic and limited”. By May 2024, the group had only lost seven fighters.
Christians
The Lebanese Christian community’s stance towards Hezbollah is mainly divided among three political parties: the Kataeb and the Lebanese Forces (LF) on the anti-Hezbollah side, and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) which has broadly supported the Shia party since 2006.
In recent months, the leaders of both the LF and Kataeb have accused Hezbollah of waging an unnecessary “war of attrition” and provoking Israel into attacks on Lebanon. They appear reluctant to participate in a regional conflict in the hope of protecting Christian areas, and they criticise Hezbollah for taking unilateral decisions in the name of all Lebanese citizens.
The FPM’s stance is more complicated. For over a decade, the FPM has provided Hezbollah with cross-sectarian cover. However, the relationship has become increasingly strained since October 2022. The then president Michel Aoun’s term came to an end and Hezbollah refused to support the presidential ambition of the FPM’s leader and Aoun’s son-in-law, Gibran Bassil.
In April 2024, Bassil declared that the FPM supports “the Resistance” (Hezbollah’s adopted name), but “rejects Hezbollah’s position to participate in the Gaza war without internal national consensus”. More recently, the FPM took advantage of the spectre of war to warn of state collapse if Lebanon’s presidential vacancy persists.
Two other important Christian stakeholders are the patriarch of the Maronite church, Bechara Boutros Rai, and a rightwing private militia in eastern Beirut called Jnoud al-Rab (Soldiers of God).
Since November 2023, Patriarch Rai has urged officials to protect Lebanon and has regularly issued statements against Hezbollah’s involvement in the Gaza war. In June, he described Hezbollah’s activities in the south as “terrorist”, which led to a boycott of the Patriarchate’s June spiritual summit by Shia religious leadership.
Jnoud al-Rab claims to represent and defend Achrafieh, a Christian neighbourhood in Beirut. The group has unofficial political and religious support, and positions itself as the Christian counterpart to Hezbollah’s concept of “self-security”.
The group has exacerbated sectarian tension within Lebanon. Jnoud al-Rab claims that Hezbollah’s actions are endangering the country and Lebanon’s Christian community. In January 2024, the group hijacked flight screens at Beirut airport and displayed a message warning Hezbollah against engaging in war with Israel.
Druze
The leading Druze politician, Walid Jumblatt, is the weathervane of Lebanese politics. Despite now being retired, he remains an important voice for the Druze (who constitute around 5% of the Lebanese population).
In October, he called on Hezbollah “not to be dragged into the war”. He also took to social media to ask Israel’s Druze community not to participate in the war.
However, he clearly stated at the beginning of the conflict that he will side with Hezbollah should Israel attack Lebanon. And, since then, Jumblatt has noted that “the rules of engagement have changed”.
Lebanon’s major communities have largely been consistent in urging restraint and would prefer to see Hezbollah avoid a war with Israel. But Hezbollah’s actions have deepened sectarian divides and have complicated Lebanon’s internal politics. Should war break out, however, the sects of Lebanon will probably all rally around Hezbollah, as was the case in 2006.
Rola El-Husseini, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Lund University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
