Ukraine recap: the bleak prospect of a Trump-Vance White House
By Jonathan Este, The Conversation
Ukraine will no longer exist by 2034, or so says former Russian president and Kremlin attack dog, Dmitry Medvedev. Medvedev didn’t say so in as many words. But, reflecting recently on the outgoing Nato leader Jens Stoltenberg’s dream of Ukraine joining within ten years, he said none of the current leaders would still be in office by 2034 and that it was “quite possible the notorious country 404 will not exist either”, using the reference to the 404 error message displayed when a webpage can’t be found to suggest the existence of Ukraine was a mistake.
But the Russian media has joined the dots, reinforcing the Kremlin’s message that it may well be a long war, but that Ukraine, which is not a real country in any case, would not win.
One person who, by his own admission, doesn’t “really care what happens to Ukraine one way or the other”, is Donald Trump’s pick as running mate, the junior senator for Ohio and arch-isolationist, J.D. Vance. Vance has made no secret of his opposition to US aid to Kyiv, something that puts him in lockstep with Trump.
So Vance’s appointment to the Republican ticket is bad news for Ukraine and equally worrying for Europe, write Stefan Wolff and David Dunn, experts in international security at the University of Birmingham. Vance sees the main threat to the US as coming from China and contends that US military aid, including – for instance – Patriot air defence batteries, would be better off being supplied to Taiwan in volume. Vance sees Volodymyr Zelensky’s aims to restore Ukraine’s 1991 borders as “fantastical”.
Without US support, write Wolff and Dunn, Ukraine cannot defeat Russia in the field. And, given how untrustworthy Putin has shown himself to be – as evidenced by the collapse of the two Minsk ceasefire agreements struck in 2014 and 2015 – it’s hard to imagine any peace deal forced on Ukraine being anything but temporary. Putin’s aggression thus rewarded is the nightmare scenario for Kyiv’s European allies, particularly those that share a border with Russia.
There’s no doubt that Russia has had the better of the conflict over the past 12 to 18 months. Sheer weight of numbers and a huge disparity in stockpiles of weapons and ammunition have enabled the invaders to keep Ukraine’s military pinned down across the frontlines, while making almost continuous incremental gains, week by week.
But if Ukraine is being ground down on land, the maritime conflict is another matter. Just this week, Ukraine’s navy spokesman, Dmytro Pletenchuk, claimed: “The last patrol ship of the Black Sea fleet of the Russian Federation is bolting from our Crimea just now. Remember this day.”
It’s a remarkable story. Basil Germond, an expert in naval warfare at Lancaster University, writes of how – despite having a far smaller navy than Russia – Ukraine has fought a nimble campaign in the Black Sea and has managed to sink more than one-third of Russia’s ships and forced the remainder of the Black Sea fleet to relocate from its traditional anchorage in Sevastopol in Crimea to safer waters in the port of Novorossiysk.
What price peace?
Zelensky, meanwhile, has called for a second international peace summit in November, and has called on Russia to attend. Whether this means he is prepared to negotiate over sovereignty is not yet clear. But the Ukrainian leader will be well aware of how tired many of his country’s people are growing of this conflict – not forgetting that for many people in the east of Ukraine and Crimea, it has now lasted a decade.
A recent poll found that 44% of Ukrainians want formal peace talks with Russia to begin as soon as possible, up from 23% in May 2023. Nick Megoran, professor of political geography at Newcastle University, thinks that Zelensky’s starting points of the full withdrawal of Russian troops, reparations and the creation of a tribunal to prosecute Russian war criminals are eminently reasonable, but believes that it would be useful and instructive to consider Putin’s reasons for invading Ukraine in the first place.
Clearly the idea repeatedly raised that Ukraine had been over-run by neo-Nazis is absurd, Megoran writes. But many Ukrainians still celebrate the exploits of Third Reich collaborator Stepan Bandera. And there is evidence of some linguistic and cultural discrimination against minorities – markedly those in Russian-speaking regions. This much has been noted by non-partisan international bodies such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the European Centre for Minority Issues.
There are also differences of opinion over national boundaries. None are justification for Russia’s invasion, the indiscriminate bombardment of civilians or the well-documented war crimes. But an awareness of Russia’s complaints, Megoran believes, would make a meaningful peace deal more possible.
Two camps
Earlier this month, Nato leaders gathered in Washington to celebrate the alliance’s 75th anniversary. It was also a chance to welcome a newcomer: Sweden attended its first summit as a full member. And it was a swansong for outgoing secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg. Mark Webber, an expert in international politics at the University of Birmingham, has noted a change in focus for the alliance, understandable in an era of instability and uncertainty.
The war in Ukraine has focused minds, particularly among European member states, on the need to boost defence production, and there is much discussion of increasing members’ defence budgets. This has been a subject of much discussion recently during the UK’s general election campaign. Training and coordination are also high on the agenda on an ongoing basis. As Webber notes here, while Nato may still be able to boast of being ready to “fight tonight”, the question remains as to how long for.
While Nato may be taking pains to renew and refocus itself, a new – rival – Eurasian bloc is developing, centred on China and Russia. A recent meeting of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) in Astana, Kazakhstan, attracted members and “dialogue partners” with a combined 30% of global GDP.
As Stefan Wolff notes here, the aim of China’s president, Xi Jinping, and Russian president Vladimir Putin as the prime movers behind the SCO is to set the organisation up as a counterweight to Nato and to use it as a leverage to reduce US influence in the region.
And with the possibility of a new, isolationist, Trump-Vance administration in the White House by the end of January 2025, this feels less far fetched than it might have done a decade ago.
Ukraine Recap is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.
Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate Editor, The Conversation
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers understand the big issues. You can also subscribe to our fortnightly recap of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.
